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A Marxist influence on
Wittgenstein via Sraffa
John B. Davis

This chapte r look at pos ible indirect influences of the Marxist tradition on the
late r ideas of Ludwig Wiugenstein via the comact between \\'ittgenstein and the
Italian economist Piero raffa. Sraffa v:a influenced by t.he Italian ~larxist
Anto nio Gramsci (Bharadwaj, l989; Ginzburg, I 998; r\aJdi, 2000), and though
\Viugenstein's t.hinking has no appare nt direct link to Grarnsci' , a case can be
made for aying that ' raffa had an impact on Wiugen tein that ·pecifically
reficCLcd Gram ci's influence on him. Tho ugh the evidence tha t Gram ci influenced , ra1Ta is solid, and the evidence that ' rana influenced \Vittgen tein is
equally ta ngible, intcrpret.ing these influence is subject to considerable cOim·o\'er ·y. Let me consequcmly begin by identifyi ng the difficulties involved in
making this argument, and t.hus sugge t the way in v.hich I a tte mpt to make the
a rgument in this cha pter.
It is first important to emphasise that, because the connections suggested here
cross bou ndaries be tween very different types or thinking Grarnsci's ideas were
about politics and the state, Sraffa's were about eco nomics, and Willgc nstein's
were about traditional philosophical topics - the argument for this particular
channel of influence needs to be couched in terms of broad philosophical tradition in Europe in the first half of the twemie th century In this rc pect, I
distingui h between certain continental European and Briti ·h traditions of idea ,
and argue that the pathway from Gramsci to \\'iugen tcin through ' raffa reflects
a n influence of the former on the latter. pecifically, the European influence was
wirldcd thro ugh the thcoret.ical practice of critique the no tion that ideas must
be evaluated in te rm of their historical role . This type of thinking stemmed
from the H egelia n tradition and ,,·as largely absent in the dominant t-\.9glophone
approach to philo ophy of la nguage bur, I argue, \\'as appljed to the latter by
rafTa, and then by the later '\·iugenstein at least in some part on accou nt of
raffa's influence. Second, 1 emphasise that the focus in this cha pter is only o n
one possible in£luencc on \Vittgenstein's later ideas. I do not claim that Marxist
or SrafTa's ideas were full y constitutive of Wittge nstein's later ideas or otherwise
exhaust their meaning nnd importance. Third, a last caveat concerns this
cha pter's approach. Because the acknowledged and direct connections between
Gramsci a nd raffa and between Sraffa and Wittgenstcin a rc few a nd contro\'er. ial, my argument doe not proceed so muc h by analysing; a pattern of influence,
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but rather by identifying shared positions across the three individuals. Two of
these shared positions are focused upon in this chapter. I argue that a
Grarnscian-like concept of 'catastrophic' equilibrium and a Gramscian-like
concept of immanence can be found in the thinking of both Sraffa and the later
Wittgenstein, though much moclified in nature and used for differen t purposes by
each.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. I n the first section 1 describe
how Gram ci's ideas originated in his thinking about political power and theory
of the state as a means of maintaining clas h egemony. Then I set for th his ideas
in con nection with the E uropean traditio n of critique, in orde t- to explain the
origins of his two notions of catastro phic eq uilibrium a nd imma nence. In the
second ection 1 turn to Sraffa to show his attachment to the European tradition
of critique and also the way in which he draws on these two fundamental
Gramscian ideas in emphasising monop oly in the market system and the idea of
what I call 'j ustified abstraction '. Here the focus i SraiTa's cr itique of Alfred
Marshall's ideas about equilibrium rather tha n his later economics. In the third
section I briefly describe th e critical en counte r between SraiTa and Wittgenstein.
Then I discuss Wittgenstein's later ideas to argue that they how a similar attachment to the European tra dition of c ritique, while making use of notions like
catastrophic equilibrium and immanen ce in the expla nation of rule-following in
language-games a nd the concept of family resemblance. The fo urth and last
section makes concluding comments about the interaction between continental
European a nd British tra ditions of ideas, based on the clisplacem ent of Sraffa
and Wittgenstein from Europe in the period of war and turmoil at the beginning
of the twentieth century. H e re I attempt to say a few things about what make for
'revolutionary' developme n ts in ideas.

Gramsci and the tradition of critique: catastrophic
equilibriwn and inunanence
H egel's contribution to the idea of critique came in the form of his accou nt of
dialectical d evelopment of thought, whereby one form of thought is evaluated
and taken up in subsequent, more complex forms. Marx made Lhis process
historical and material, a nd placed classes in conflict and opposition to one
another in order to demonstrate the working ou t of the process. Gramsci, caught
up in and leading the political struggles of the working class in Italy at the beginning of the century, brought Marx's thinking to b ear on the contest for power.
Central to this was a changed view of the sta te. The Social Democratic econd
lnternational had treated such institutions as the Church, the schools and universities, unions, political parties, the media, e tc., as repressive apparatuses on
a nalogy to coercive state apparatuses such as the police, the cour ts, the prisons,
the army and the government, but had still defmed the state instrumentally as a
class dictatorship based on the exercise of brute force. Gramsci, beginning in his
early Ordine Nuovo period, however, developed a theory of ideological state apparatuses based on his con cept of hegem ony. Exercising state pov.,er meant more
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than just controlling the machinery of government. It also m eant organi ing
class domination throug h the creation of a world view within ' private', non-state
institutions. In Lhis latter respect, the dominant class or cia fraction exercises
hegemony and intellectual and moral leadership (direzione) that complements its
exercise of brute force. State power, in effect, insinuates itself throughout a
whole array of non-state social institutions.
Gramsci's u e of the concept of critique involved an unve iling of hidden
structures of power. By locatiHg instruments of class dom ina tio n within what
were convemionally regarded as non-state institutions, he ·hawed that these
institu tions were not benign with respect to class conflict, while at the same time
exposing their ideological nature. He thu s advanced the understanding of the
Italian political process by demonstrating a n unappreciated historical role played
by ideas in that process. This meant that t he idea of the tate operative in the
European Social D emoc1·atic parties of the time needed to be abandoned. T he
state was not simply an agent or instrument of b ig monopoly capital. With political power operating through a range of non- tate institutions, different ruling
class factions exercised different types of power in different aren as. Italy was at a
point. Gramsci believed , at which these differen t factions were on the verge of
immobilising each o ther, thus jeopardising the overall class power of the bourgeoisie, with a severe po litical crisis a possible outcome. ln such circumstances,
an 'heroic' personality migh t emerge to create a dictatorship, becau e the forces
in conflict 'balana each other in a catastrophic manner, that is to say, they balance each
other in such a way that a continuation of the conOict can o nly terminate in
their reciprocal destruction ' (Gramsci, I 97 L: 2 19; emphasis added). This balance
was framed as a kind of equ ilibrium - a cata trophic equilibrium - by Gramsci.
'In the modern world , the equilibrium with catastrophic prospects occurs ...
between forces whose opposition is historically incurable' (Gramsci, 1971: 222).
Thus Gramsci's critiq ue of conventional notions of the state, bourgeois and
Social D emocratic, generated a new conceptual device to help acco unt for the
proce s. H ow arc we Lo understand this concept? The idea of a catastrophic
equilibrium involves a r~jection of the holist idea of society as a unified totality,
albeit a totality explained in terms of class domination. The holist concept of a
totality implies both lhat the social whole include· its parts, and that the par ts
acquire their meaning according to their integration with in the whole. But
Gramsci's view of a catastrophic equilibrium is of an unsustaina b le juxtaposition
of oppo ed and discordant forces, the resolution of which in the fo rm-of a new
class hegemony destroys one side of this opp osition, rather than raising it up and
preserving it in the H egelian sense of Aujhebwzg. The parts of the social whole
consequently do not acquire their meaning from the whole, hecause they seek to
be exclusive o f one another, re-casting the whole solely in terms of their own
image. T he idea of a catastrophic equilibrium is thus that of a n unstable, transient balance in a state of affairs, one in wh ich past and futu re can be radically
disjoined in an unpredictable and abrupt manner. In effect, histo ry ratl1er than
logic explained the evolution of ocieties.
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Gram ci's critique of the instrumental conception of the form of the state also
had as an underlying foundation a parallel critique of economi m, the notion that
there cxi t objective laws of historical dcvelopmem similar to natural laws Lhat
determine the path and character of political truggle. His ideas had grown out o f
his expe rience as a leader of the working-class movement in the Turin factory
councils. Placing impona nce on linking theor}' and practice, he under toad Marx
to be the founder of the philosophy of pra.xis that combined British political
economy. German ideali t philo ophy and French revolutionary politics. However,
he believed (Gramsci, 197 1: 388 ff.) that i\Ian{ philo ophy had subsequently been
mi ta kenl)' given both an idealist interpretation (in Italy particularly by Croce,
brieny a Marxist) and a pllllosophical materialist inte rpretation (by o rthodox
J\larxi ts Plekhano\· and Bukharin). Both interpretations exhibited a tendency to
rely on metaphysical rather than hjstoricaJ expla nations, which h ad the effect of
substituting a rgumentS between intellectuals and pany member for investigation
of the historical so·uggle of the working class. H e Lhus calJed for recovery of
Marx's origi nal tripartite nexus, characterising it specifically as immarm1tist in being
based upon a thoroughly historicised understanding of the concrete and material
developmem of history: 'The philosophy of praxis continues Lhc philo ophy of
immane nce but purifies it of alJ its metaphysical apparatus and b1·ings it onto the
concrete terrain of history' (Gramsci, 197 I : 450).
G r·amsci's immanentist interpretation of the philosophy of praxis alternatively, his rejection of all forms of transcenden ce
is specifically a doctrine
regarding the interpre ta tion of generalit or universals in the H egelia n tradition.
Hegel, lollmving Kan t's rejection o f the idea of bare particula rs ('intuitions
without concepts are blind'), similarly rej ected the idea of a n a bstract universal
arguing in favo ur of concrete universal which require more 'intimate' relation
with the pa rticulars they involve. Need less to sa y, the ense in wh ich concrete
universal involve Lheir particulars is philo ophicalJy complex and also subject to
a ra nge of interpreta tions within the H egelian Lradition. ~loreover, just ho..,·
Gramsci belie,·ed the concept of a concre te universal was to be understood has
been subject to considerable controversy. oncthele , his rejection of the idea of
lran. cendence, for example, as expressed in his assertion that 'man is historical
becoming' ju lilies saying tha t he rejected the idea of an ab tract universal. h is
Lh.is development of the European tradition of critique, I sugge t, that mo t
clearly represents his philosophical side. Together with his characterisation of
the histo rical process in terms of the idea of catastrophic equilibrium. it repree nts two key aspects of his Marxism tha t can be re-located in modified form in
' raffa's early economic thinking.

Sraffa and critique of neo-classical economics:
monopoly and justified abstraction
SraiTa was forced to Oee Italy after ?\Iussolini came to powec Prior to his arrival
in Cambridge, he had regular contact wilh Gramsci, and though he was a
. upporte r of the working class, his degrcc of attachme nt to G t·am sci's particular
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political posJttons is unclear. Later, however, after Gramsci's imprisonment,
raffa became important for him as a com act with the outside world. Gramsci
also drew upon Sraffa 's assistance for books a nd materials for the writing of wha t
subsequently became his Prison XofRhooks. raffa, in turn, maintained his workingclass political allegia nce, though his work was almo t exclusively devoted to
recon truning economic theory. Thi latter began with his critiqu · of key
assumptions of M a r haitian nco-classical economic ( rafTa, 1925; 1926; cf.
~Iane chi, 1986). the n continued '"ith his editing of the writings of the cia sica)
economist David Ricardo, and fi nally culminated in his radjcal reconstruction of
economic thinking in his book Production qf Commodifies h)1 ,\leans qf Commodities
(Sraffa, 1960).
M y foc us in this chapter is on rafTa's critical evaluation of Alfred Marshall's
neo-classical economic ideas as the first clear evidence that a method of
reasoning e ncou ntered through Gramsci was to have a key place in rafTa's 0\\11
work. h is true tha t raffa's later Production of CommoditiL.S was more cxplicitJr
designed as a work of critique, pecifically of neo-classical economic concepts o f
production and capital. But raffa 's known re ported impact on \ \'ittgcnstein in
the 1920 (cf. ~ lalcolm, 1958; Roncaglia, 1978; Da..,; , 1988; Andrew , 1996),
subsequently acknowledged by \ \'ittgenstein in the preface to his Philosophical
lnuesl(l(alions, came before raffa had gone very far in developing his Production of
Commoditirs thinking. M oreover, though raffa and \\'iugenstein continued to be
in contact with one a nothe r in Cambridge after this time, there is little evidence
that rafTa's subseque nt work on Production of Commodities figured in eitJ1er their
conversations or the d evelopment of Wittge nstein's philosophical thinking.
H ow, then, did ' rafTa develop his critical approach in his papers on ~lars hall ?
C entral to this questio n is SrafT'a's critical treatment of Marshall's under tanding
of independence between indu tries (cf. Panico and alvadori, 199+; longio,1,
I 996). ~lars halJ's partial equilibrium method of analysis of' cparatc industry
upply function makes industries relati,·e ly independent in the sense tl1at a
change in the quantity of output produced by one indu rry lea,·e the quantitic
produced by other indu tries unchanged. But this invoked a hort-ru n analy-;is,
and chan~es in one indu try' ou tput raised the que tion of whether in the Jon~
run there were dimini hing or increasing return to calc: that is. whether
average co LS of all indu tries ro c or fell with me expan ion of an} one indu!>t~.
In one respect. suppo ing that tills occurred was compatible "ith ~Jarshall's
analy is or indu try independence. lf variations in an industry's output operated
directly only o n the co t fu nction of Lhe represemativc firm of that in dustry, this
affected the price in that industry, which might sub equentJy affect prices in
other indu tries, possibly causing further c ha nges in their cost fu nctions. But
these la tter influences were indirect (in the sense that they were conveyed
through the c hange in other industry costs), and were compatible ""ith ~ l arshall's
assumption o r a rela tive independence between indu tries. H owever, were variation in a single industry's output to operate directly on the cost fu nction of
representative firms in all indu tries, then the industries were mulUally interd ependent, and Marshall's parual equilibrium analysis broke down.
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Marshall had tried to argue that increasing and diminishing returns were of
the sort compatible with the first case. In the case of diminishing returns, he
assumed that an increase in industry output required more intensive use of some
primary factor of production in scarce supply but only in the expanding industr y.
Thus there were only indirect and no direct effects on other industries. Sraffa,
however. argued that it was h ighly unlikely that such primary factors were used
in just one industry. In the increasing returns case, M arshall had to assume that
such returns were external to the firm and inte rnal to the industry of which it
was a part, so that they directly affected the co t fw1ction of the representative
firm of the industry, but only indirectly affected Lhose of representative firms in
other industries. rafTa noted, however, that M a rshall had been fully cognisant of
tl1e fact that, in tl1e real world, there were increasing returns exte rnal to both the
fJim and the industry. Thus in both cases (diminishing and increasing returns)
M arshall's analysis could not support his initial conception of tbe relative independence of industries.
To see the significance of these arguments, it is importa nt to recognise that a
particular concept of economic equilibrium was at the cen tre of the debate.
Marshall's motivation for treating industries as relatively indep endent from one
a nother had been to provide an account of price on an industry-by-industry
basis in terms of symmetrically opposed forces of supply and demand.
Essentially, each industry could be understood solely in terms of its own underlying supply and demand conditions, because changes in the supply conditions of
any one industry had only indirect efrects on the supply conditio ns of the others.
But when M arshall' highly restrictive assumptions about the nature of returns
were ruled out, so that indirect effects of changes in an industry's o utput on the
cost functions of other industries were replaced by direct effects, then the underlying forces determining indu try prices could neither be compartmen talised on
a n industry-by-industry basis, nor were they any longer describable in terms of
the symmetrically opposed forces of supply and dem a nd. In effect, the forces
determining industry prices were communicated through a network of crosscutting production relationships between industries rhat transferred the effects of
changes in cost of production i11 any one industry to the prices of all industries
{cf. Davis, 1993).
The idea that supply-and-demand fo rces operated everywhere in essentially
the san1e way made histor ical development an insignificant factor in explaining
markets. Indeed, that the same principles al ..vays operated in the sam e manner
made supply and demand timeless sorts of principles much like Jaws of nature.
Sraffa rejected this conception of the econom ic world, and believed that laws in
econorrucs were historically specific. To bring this understanding to bear on neoclassical economics involved showing that the key concept of equilibrium which
Marshall employed was not adequate for explaining markets, and in fact was not
even adequate on its own terms. That is, because it was internally inconsistent,
Marshall's account could not sustain his view of markets in supply-and-demand ,
partial equilibrium terms. Moreover, the way in which that account broke down
demonstrated that a more historical understanding of equilibrium forces in
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markets was needed. For raffa, that more historical under ta nding led to a
conception of capitalist economies as subject to a process of radically discontinuous change, in which conditions supporting a temporarily e tlled state of affairs
also conta ined the seeds of a disruption of that state of affairs. rafTa's conclusion to his 1926 critique of l\farshall was thus tha t the compctiti,·e market
syste m , as Mar hall had expla ined it, ultima tely collapsed once a more realistic
view of increasing returns was incorporate d in it.
H ow, then, do these ideas rela te in partic ular to Gramsci's concept of catastrophic equilibrium and immanence? l suggest tha t . raffa used the for mer in
connec tion with his understanding of the development of monopoly in markets,
and used the Iauer in connection with his understanding of what was involved in
makingjustifiablc a b tractions in economics.
The idea that equilibrium is a temporarily sealed tate of a ffa ir that contain
the seeds of its own breakdown is not unlike Gramsci's usc 9 f the concept of
catastrophic equilibrium. In his 1920s account, Sraffa a rgues that the development of monopoly i~ a Like ly outcome of increasing returns that re main internal
to the reprc entative firm of an industry. M onopo lies then develop not only at
the expense of other firms, but also at the expense of the ystcm of balanced
competition that l\ farshall saw as the cs ential characte ristic of the market
system . Thus the presence of internal increasing returns aero s industries
signalled an unstable and transient set of circumstances in which market power
and ba rriers to entry would ultimately replace a system of free competition. The
equilibrium Sraffa described as being implicit in M a rsha ll's thinking was consequently catastrophic in Gramsci's sense of the term in tha t it characteri ed
'forces whose opposition is historically incura ble'.
Sraffa's critique of Marshall's treatment of variable return s was also accompanied by a complaint about his me thodology (Davis, 1998). The classical
econ omists, raffa noted, ha d understood diminishing and increasing returns to
be rooted in dissimilar economic phenomena, and accordingly did not explai n
them at a higher b ·cl of abstraction as instances of one genera l type of principle. Mar hall, according!)~ 'found it nece sary to introduce certain
modification into the form of the tw·o law ' as inherited fro m the cia. sica!
economists, in order to m erge them into a 'single "law" of nonproponional
returns' ( raffa, 1926: 53 7). This reflected M a r ha ll's conviction that ' the essential cau es determining the price of particular commoditie may be implified
and grouped together' so as to explain price in market soldy in terms of the
'forces of demand and supply' (Sraffa, 1926: 535). C learly raffa though t this
recourse to abstraction and 'essential causes' u~usti ficd. Without saying what his
view of proper abstraction was, we can say tha t, for raffa, '" ha t was objectionable in M a rshall 's methodo logy was its recourse to abstraction understood in
terms of other abstractions, rather than in terms of the relevant underlying
concre te phenomena. Sraffa, then, did have a n understanding o f justifiable
abstraction . It probably goes too far to regard tl1is understand ing as invoh·ing a
commitment to an immane ntist idea of a concrete universal, especially since
SrafTa's ideas a re e laborated in terms of arguments a bou t the equilibrium
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concept in economics rather than in terms of an appraisal of historical forces
that was Gramsci's concern. Nonetheless, the motivation is similar in each. Both
tie concepts and generalisation closely to the historical process, and reject the
idea that concepts and generalisation operate in a timeless, transcendental space.
Thus it seems fair to say that Sraffa drew on G ramsci's thinking in his own frrst
significant attempt a t critique in economics.

Wittgenstein and the critique of meaning:
rule-following and family resemblance
The episode in which Sraffa is said to have cau sed Wittgenstein to doubt his
early Tracta/us ([192 1] 196 1) framework involved a critique of that early framework. Wittgenscein had understood the m eaning of a term to be the object
which that term names, a nd had then sought to explain language as a configuration of names that could be mapped outt: in a logical structure of thought. Sraffa,
howeve1; asked Wittgenstcin to explain to him the logical form of a gesture,
giving as an ex.ample a fa mous Italian gesture used to express contempt
(Malcolm, 1958). A gesture, of course, has its meaning in specific contexts, and
thus cannot be grasped purely as a piece of language. In posing his question to
Wittgenstein, then, Sraffa required that Wittgenstein consider how concepts
function in practical settings. Indeed, the gesture in question could be delivered
in an obscene m a nner. T hus Sraffa also unveiled meaning hidden fi·om ordinary
view, since one had to understand context to know whether a gesture had this
adclitional dimension.
When Wittgenstein abandoned his Tractatus picture theory of meaning, he
recognised that representation is only one of the uses to which la nguage is put.
Thus understanding how language is used in particular practices in people's
everyday experience is as important as understanding its representational features.
'Look at the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment,'
Wittgenstein said (1958: §42 1). This was famously e..'<plained in terms of the idea
of a 'language-game', or the idea that language is used in localised cmmections to
accomplish particula r kinds of things. A language-ga me, moreoveJ~ is linked to
the notion of a 'form of life'. ' [T]hc term "language-game" is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a
form of lilc' (ibid.: §23). Both of these no tions, it seems fair to say, reflect a kind of
crilique not unlike that which we see in Gramsci and Sraffa. In the fu·st place,
understanding concepts and ideas depends on placing them in their p ractical
context. Second, doing so often reveals features of those concepts and ideas tha t
arc otherwise not obvious. In effect, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein problcm atises the wh ole notion of 'language itself' as a n object of study.
How, then , ought one to under stand a la nguage-game? Central to
Wittgenstein's answer is his treatment of how to follow the rules of a game.
Following a rule competently depends upon seeing how that rule functions in its
la nguage-game, within the form of life in which it is e mbedded. T his is fundam entally a jJractical rather than an intellectual (interpretive) task: 'any interpretation
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sLill h angs in the air along with what it interprets, and ca nnot give it any upport.
Inte rpretation by themselves do not dete rmine meaning' (ibid.: § 198). In effect,
then , obeying a rule entails commitme nt ro a set of practices and, \\'ittgenstein
emphasi es. ultimately h as to be done 'blindly' (ibid.: §2 19). Indeed, to only 'think
one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule' (ibid.: 202). This presents a far
differem pictu re of rules a nd rule-following from that found in a purely
language-oriemcd point of view. When ruJes and rule-follo ..ving are a pan of a
set o f activities a nd enure forms of life, they arc imerwoven with other ru les and
practices rather tha n being discrete emiLies. This further complicates the meanings we gin' to words which become in fact 'a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing ' th at at most have a ' family resembla nce' to o ne another (ibid.: §66).
H ow do these ideas relate LO those advanced for Gramsci a nd raffa above?
My argument is that the chief points of contact between these ideas of
Wiugcn tein and Lho e of Gramsci and raffa arise from the former's emphasis
on rule-following and fa mily re emblan ce. RuJc-following relate to t he emphasis
Gram sci and ra!Ta place on equilibria (or se ttled state of affairs of any son ) as
being transitory and temporary: Family re emblance relate to their understanding of reasonable abstraction an d generalisation.
The idea that equilibrium might be catastrophic may seem foreign to
\Vittgcnstcin' later ideas. But a less dramaLic render ing of the term 'catastrophic' as un table and changeable can be argued to capture an important
dimension of Wittgenstein's understanding of what is involved in following rules
in a language-game. Following a rule is no t a matter of associating the past uses
of a term with their occasions of use, a nd then inductively applying that term in
like circumstances in the future. Following a rule presupposes a commiLmen t to
participate in the form of life in \vhich that language-game is played . , uch
commitment on the part of ma ny indi\'iduals establishes a framework in which
mea nings may evolve, as when individuals apply and accept the usc of a term in
new contexts. Consequently, if we see Language-ga mes as having equilibrium-like
properties, in the e nse thar a collection of meanings within a language-game at
any one time possess a set of relatively idemifiable relationships towards one
another, then because these rela rionships may be transformed and reconfigured
as the language-game is played, tl1ese equilibrium relation hips may also become
' unstable' and 'cha ngeable' .
Wittgenstein's idea of the meaning of a concept as a family resemblance
suggests much the arne idea, though in a more static sense. Pu tting aside change
in meaning, a concept al any one tin1e consritute a combination of a pplications
and senses that stand in uncertain relaLion to o ne ano ther, since no central or
essential sense unites all the ways in v\'hich the concept may be used. Thus, the
fam ily resemblance notion suggests that concepts are like eq uilibria that contain
disco rdant clements a notion not far removed from Gramsci's catastrophic
equilibrium idea.
Wittgcnstein's i nvestigations philosophy is often seen as a rejection of metaphysics and of the forms of ab traction on which metaphysics depends. But this
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ha rdly implies that he rej ected the very idea of generaJity itself Rather, for
Wittgenstein, generality is a product of family resemblance - th e gene raJity of a
concep t is produced out of the myriad overlapping a nd criss-crossing senses in
which that concept is used. This means, however, that since the re is no single the refore essentiaJ - meaning shared by all of the ways in which an expression is
used, we accordingly have no way of specifying concepts apart from dcsctibing
their actual uses and conditions of application . Indeed, it seems for Wirtgenstein
tha t the entire business of investigating abstract concepts is suspect. Thus while it
may be awh.'ward to use the idea of a conc re te universaJ in connection with
Wittgenste in's later views, nonetheless his image of a concept as being constituted out of a famiJy resemblance effectively embeds particularity of use in the
very idea of generaJi ty.
In offering these remarks about rule-followin g and fa miJy re ·emblance here, I
do not wish to enter into the voluminous de bates between philosophers over the
meaning a nd significance of WJttgenstein's la ter philosophy. Rather, the purpose
here is to attempt to show how Wittgenstein's la ter mientation may have connections to a criticaJ tradition of ideas that was introduced into Cam bridge by
Sraffa. What seems interesting in this atte mpt is that it makes a case for a
Ma rxist influence, aJbei t translated and indirect, on the later Wittgenstein. The
strength of this case, however, depends in p a rt on seeing diffe re nt traditions of
ideas as coming into contact. Prior to his re turn to Cambridge in the ] 920s
Wittgenstein was entirely at home in the early analytic, logical a tomist philosophy of Bertrand Russell and G.E. M oore. But then he came into contact with
raffa, to whom he records, in the preface to Philosophical Investigations, his indebtedness 'for the most consequential ideas of this book' (1958: x). I dose, then, by
looking very briefly a t the issue of interacting traditions of ideas.

Interaction of European and British ideas:
the displacement of Sraffa and Wittgenstein
M y argume nt in this chapter is that a European tradition of ideas deriving originally from H egel playecl t1 role in the la ter development of AngJophone
p hilosophy of language, and specificaJJy had a n impact on the la ter thinking of
\Vittgenstein by way of Sraifa. 1\[oreover, the particular interpre tation of Hegel's
thinking involved came by way of Marxism, as formulated by Gramsci in his
philosophy of pra:<.is. The argument that Sra fTa was the key inte rmediary may
seem odd on the surface, since Wittgenstein was Austrian and should have been
no less aware of the critical tradition in European thinking than Sraffa. Were this
true, th ere would not have been a role for Sraffa in influencing Wittgcnstein's
later ideas. But as is well known, Wittgenstein was not well acquainted with or
interested in the H egelia n tradition. Also, although he had a n interest at one
point in sociaJism (and visited Russia in the hope of seeing socialism in practice),
he had very little apprecia tion for Marxism either as a body of ideas or as a
political programme. Accordingly, his early work is enti rely conso nant with work
already carried on in Cambridge by Russell, Moore and other s. ralTa's subse-
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quc n t com act with Wiugenstein can according ly be een as a vehicle for bringing
the European critical tradition- or at least its thrust to his a ttention.
\Viugen tein's later work is often regarded as revolutiona ry. It i re,·olutionary
in tha t it not only challenged his mm (and Rus ell's and ~Ioorc' early ideas), but
in tha t it brought into que tion the entire a pproach LO philosophy of language
domina m in Britain a t the time. Wittgenstein's earlier Traclalus, while a rema rka ble contributiou, was n o t revolutionary in the way in which the later
lnvestiKatiom was. Why, t.he n , did Wittgenste in become ' revolutio nary' in his La ter
work? This long-deba ted and perhaps unanswera ble questio n has usuaLly been
exam ined in terms of Wittgenstein's genius as a philosophe r a nd his personal
intell ctua l developme nt, and has been littJc investigated in te rms of Sraffa's
possible inllucncc on Wittge nstein. But th is seems to presuppose tha t developments wit.hin philosophy derive entirely from thr nature o f ideas 'vvithin
philosop hy. It i reasonable to think, o f cour e, that ideas from econ omics or
even politic would not be inlluentiaJ in ch a nging ideas in philosophy. No doubt
this has lr d orne to disregard ra1Ja's known influence on \\'ittgcnstein. But the
a rgu m nt here is that it was Sraffa 's philo ophical virws no t hi economic tha t in fluencrd \Viugcnstein. Sra1Ja presumably nc,·cr explained ~ larshalJ'
pa rtial equilibrium a nalysis to \\'ingenstein . R a ther, he applied th e sort of philosophical critique he had ad,·anced against ~larshall to \Vittge n tein' early
a umption .
H owever, 1 am not a ttempting here to explain the revolu tionary nature of
Wittgenstein's late r philosophy in terms of rafTa's personal influe nce. I am
sugge ting, rather; tha t individuals are beare rs of imcllec tualtraditio ns, and that
it is the ir contact with o ne a nother as such bea rers tha t proclucrs revolutionary
changes in ideas. Thus Sraffa's displacement from Italy to Brita in by the rise of
Mussoli ni brought two histories of ideas into prox imity with o n e another that
had previously been la rgely sepa rate. But there is a special dimension to this
partic ula r occasion of contact. When su ch con tacts occur, more often than not,
communication between indi,i duals is not succe sful, because their different
pa radigm a tic orienta tions invol\'e such diffe re nt structure a nd organisation of
idea as to effectively preclude it. Certainly . rafTa was not the only individual
wo rking in Brita in whose inteUectuaJ anteced ents were not fam ilia r or at hom e
the re. ?\or wa · he the only uch individual \\~th "hom \\'ittgcnste in came into
contact. But his pa rt icular inhe ritance- the c ritical trad ition - o ffe red a means
of engagemem with British inteUectuaJ work which othe r non- Briti h lraditions
may not have po. ses eel. That is, by shm,~ng comradictions in ~ [arshaU ' neoclassical syste m that de rived from its critiq ue as a syste m of ideas functioning
within a n historical fram ework, Sraffa was a ble to ma ke relevant his ovm
thinking about the ma rket economy. Sra ffa' ideas were revolutionary in
economics, then, specifically because they were from the Euro pean critical
tradition that often opera ted by revealing a hidden ' histo ri cist' dimension to
system s of ideas which claimed to be timeless a nd universal in th eir a bstraction.
And su ch revelation could be the w1doing preci ely of their claims LO universalily.
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\1\'ingcnstcin arguably took up his revolutiona ry ma ntle from Sralf<t thro ugh
this pa rticular intermediation. By exposing his own earlier ideas to critical examination, he dem onstra ted the place a nd prio ri ty of his la ter fra mework. Again.
this is fa r from sa ying tha t the conte nt of . raffa' thinking <tbout economics is
wha t is revolutionary in the la ter Wittgenste in. Rather, it is to sa r tha t
Witlge nstcin'~ la ter philosophical ide<ts were revolutionary because they presupposed the same philosophical posture of critiq ue tha t • raffa' (and Gramsci ' )
a pproachc posses cd . In th e British thinking o f the first ha ll' of the twen tieth
century. ·which la rgely lacked a way of re flexively ceing ideas functionin~ within
historical and social contexts. bringing this way of thinking to meaning and
la nguage was indeed re\'Olutionary. Thus it seems that revolutionary hifts in
idras may not be so much a matter of \vha t individuals reason a nd argue
{though th is is nm to de ny , ra ffa a nd \\'ittgen. tein's rcsp 'ctive rema rkable intellectua l abilities). Rather, uch shifts seem to come about because of
confrontation between entire tra ditions or ideas. o me uch confronta tions,
olwiouo;ly, are more producti,·e than others. In thr insta nce examined here, a
particula rly productive confrontation in traditio n of ideas has been a rgued to
have involved the reformulation a nd re-application o f idea<; central lo the
l\ larxist tradition to twentieth-century philosophy of la nguage in Brita in. 1

Note
I am indebted to G avin KiLching a nd 1'\igel Pleasant:. for helpful comments on earlier
vcr:.io ns of this chap ler.

References
.\ndrc\\ ..,, D. ( 1996) ·~Olhi ng is hiddrn: a \\"iugl'rmein ian imerpn·talion of Smffa ',

Cambrir(l!,f' Journal qf Economics 20, 763 77.
Bharad waj, K. (1989) ' Picro Sraffa: the 111an and the scholar a tributl·', in T/wmr.s in fifllue
and Di\ln"hution. Clasrical ThrOT)' &appraisrd, London: Cn\\'in I lpmm.
Davis, .J. (1988) ·, ' raiTa. WiugcnsLein and neoclassical econ omics·, Cnmbridf,f ]oumol qf
f:.(onnmir.l 12, 29 36.
-I 1993) ' · raffa, interdependence and dem an d: the Gram cian inlluence', Rmeu· qf
Polillral /~onon!J 5( I ), 22- 39.
( 1998) • raffa \ c<u·ly p hilosophicai Lhinking', Rrwu· qJ l>oftllcal Aconom;• I 0{4), 4 7 i 9 1.
Ginzbur~, Andrea (1998) ·• rdlfa and social an a lysis: ~omt' ml.'thodological aspens' ,
unp ublbhcd.
G ramsci, A. ( 1971 ). t!l'rliomfrom thePrison.\otebook.1 qJ , Jutomo C:mmsd, <'ditcd b>· Q Hoare
and G. :'-Juwcll miLh, ~ew York: l mernational.
~ l akolm, :\. (1958) Ludwig Jl 'illgmstein: A .\lmwir, Oxford: O xford CniYcrsity Press.
~l ane chi, A. (1986) 'l\. com parati\·e evaluation of Sraffa '!. "The law:. of ret urn~ under
comp<'titive conditio ns" and its Ita lian p recursor', Cnmhridgr Journal qf f;'ronnmirs 10,
1 12.
~ l ong"iovi , G. ( 1996) 'Sraffa's critiq ue o f ~ larsh all : a reassrssmem ', Cambrid,f!,r ]ournal q/
Eronomirs 20. 207 24.
l'\ald i, N. (2000) 'The friendship between Piero Sraffa and A n to nio G ramsci in tht' years
19 19 1927', Europran Journal qf tlze HiJto~J' qf Economic 1 /mtl[!.ltl 7( I ). 79 I l -l .

.I ,\lan-ist i1!}luma z•ia. ·,qffa

143

~. (199•1) 'Sraffa. ;\larshall and the problem of tTturns', Eumpmn]ournal of tltr lfi,tory qf Eronomic Thought 1(2), 323~1 '3.
Ro ncaglia, A (I978) Sm.fJa and thr Tluor_)' qf Prices, Chichester: \ \'ilcy.
Sraffa, I~ ( 1925) 'Sulk relatione fra costo e quamita prodollt~ ·, . lnnab di & rmomio 2.
277 :w t
( 1926) 'Tiw Iii\\ , of reurrno; under competitive conditions', Economu Jounwl 36.

P.mico, C:. and Salvndori,

535 '>0.
( I %0) Pmdurtwn of (.ommodilifj ~}· .\!eom qf Commodlilf.l, Cambridge: Camblidl{e
Uni,t·rsity Pn·~..,.
\\'iugcmtt·in, L. ( I95R) Plnlt~~opluca/ lnwtigatlonJ, Oxford: Blac k\\cll.
( 1% I) 'Tradalu1 l.o_!!,Jro Plnlmoplnrur, :\'e\\ York: Routledge and Kcgan Paul.

